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ABSTRACT
This paper introduces a new attack on recent messaging systems
that protect communication metadata. The main observation is
that if an adversary manages to compromise a user’s friend, it can
use this compromised friend to learn information about the user’s
other ongoing conversations. Specifically, the adversary learns whether
a user is sending other messages or not, which opens the door to
existing intersection and disclosure attacks. To formalize this com-
promised friend attack, we present an abstract scenario called the
exclusive call center problem that captures the attack’s root cause,
and demonstrates that it is independent of the particular design or
implementation of existing metadata-private messaging systems.
We then introduce a new primitive called a private answering ma-
chine that can prevent the attack. Unfortunately, building a secure
and efficient instance of this primitive under only computational
hardness assumptions does not appear possible. Instead, we give a
construction under the assumption that users can bound their max-
imum number of friends and are okay leaking this information.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the past few years there has been a renaissance of messaging
systems [2, 3, 17, 18, 26, 27] that allow users to communicate on-
line without their messages being observed by ISPs, companies,
or governments. These systems target a property called metadata-
privacy which is stronger than end-to-end encryption: encryption
hides the content of messages but it does not hide their existence
nor any of their associated metadata (identity of the sender or
recipient, frequency, time, and duration of communication, etc.).
While hiding metadata has been the subject of a long line of work
dating back three decades [7], there is renewed interest due to a
proliferation of controversial surveillance practices [4, 6, 12–14],
and the monetization of users’ private information [5, 19, 21, 23].
Existing metadata-private messaging (MPM) systems guarantee
that as long as the sender and the recipient of a message are not
compromised, their communication cannot be observed by an ad-
versary (the adversary learns that users are part of the system, but
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not whether they communicate). If either the sender or the recip-
ient is compromised, MPM systems provide no guarantees (e.g., a
compromised sender could trivially disclose to whom it is sending
a message). In this paper we investigate whether an adversary—by
compromising and leveraging a user’s friends—can learn anything
about the user’s other ongoing communications.
At first glance the answer to the above question appears to be no
(assuming that the user does not voluntarily disclose the existence
of other communications to compromised friends). After all, the
guarantees of MPM systems should prevent the adversary from
learning anything about conversations between uncompromised
clients. Nevertheless, we find that this is not actually the case: en-
gaging in a conversation with a compromised client consumes a
limited resource, namely the number of concurrent conversations
that a user can support. By observing a client’s responses (or lack
thereof), a compromised friend can learn whether the user has
fully utilized this limited resource (i.e., the user is busy talking to
others). In Section 5 we show how this one bit of information en-
ables existing intersection and disclosure attacks [1, 8–11, 15, 16,
20, 22, 24, 25] that invalidate MPM systems’ guarantees.
More interestingly, our compromised friend attack applies to all
MPM systems that support a notion of dialing [18] (or any other
mechanism that allows clients to start new conversations over time).
We give a formal characterization of the attack with a scenario
that we call the exclusive call center problem, which abstracts away
the design or implementation of MPM systems. We then introduce
a primitive called a private answering machine that solves the ab-
stract problem and can be used by clients of MPM systems to pre-
vent the compromised friend attack. In particular, clients use a pri-
vate answering machine to select with which friends to communi-
cate, while guaranteeing that compromised friends learn no infor-
mation about other ongoing communications.
Unfortunately, building a cryptographically-secure private an-
swering machine that does not require placing assumptions on the
number of callers (i.e., the number of friends that a user can have)
or incurring prohibitive delay or bandwidth appears hard. We com-
promise on this point and give a construction that can be used by
MPM systems under the assumption that users can place a bound
on their maximum number of friends. Our construction has two
limitations: (1) it leaks the bound chosen by the user, and (2) it in-
creases the latency of communication between a pair of users pro-
portional to the chosen bound. Despite these limitations, our work
addresses a previously overlooked attack and allows users in MPM
systems to communicate without leaking sensitive information.
In summary, the contributions of this work are:
• An abstraction that captures the leakage from oversubscribing
a fixed resource in the presence of adversarial probing (§3).
• The compromised friend attack which exploits the fixed commu-
nication capacity of MPM systems (§5).
• The construction of a private answering machine (§4.1) that can
be used in MPM systems to avoid leaking information to com-
promised friends about users’ other ongoing conversations (§6).
2 BACKGROUND
The goal of metadata-private messaging systems [2, 3, 17, 26, 27]
is to allow a pair (or group) of friends to exchange bidirectional
messages without leaking metadata to any party besides the sender
and the recipient. A pair of users are friends if they have previously
shared a secret, either out-of-band (e.g., in person at a coffee shop),
or in-band with an add friend protocol [18]. Users in these systems
exchange a fixed number of messages with their friends in discrete
time epochs called rounds; users participate in every round even
if they are idle. This ensures that an attacker that monitors the
network cannot tell when users are actively communicating with
their friends or starting/stopping conversations. This also places a
bound on the number of active conversations that a user can have
at any time; we refer to this as the client’s communication capacity.
Once a client reaches its communication capacity, it cannot send
messages to other friends until it ends an existing conversation. As
a result, clients use a separate dialing protocol to coordinate the
start and end of conversations. In a dialing protocol, a client sends
a short message (a few bits) to a friend regardless of whether the
friend’s client has reached its communication capacity. The dial-
ing message is sufficient to notify a user that one of their friends
wishes to communicate, and to agree on a round to start the con-
versation [18]. There are multiple ways in which a client can react
to a dialing message. Some natural choices are:
• If the client has not reached its communication capacity, it can
automatically accept the call and start a new conversation.
• The client could prompt the user (similar to calling a friend in
Skype), who can choose to accept or reject the call.
• If at capacity, the client could randomly end an existing conver-
sation to make room for a new one.
Each of these choices is problematic. If the client’s communi-
cation capacity is 1 (as in some of the existing systems [26, 27])
and the client automatically accepts calls, then any of the client’s
friends can easily learn when the client is not active in a conversa-
tion simply by calling. Leaving the choice to the users is slightly
better since the user can choose to ignore or delay accepting some
calls, but their choices can still inadvertently lead to intersection
attacks. Ending conversations randomly hurts usability and might
still leak information. The goal of the next section is to formalize
the desired properties of the client’s answering mechanism.
3 EXCLUSIVE CALL CENTER PROBLEM
In order to avoid the details of particular MPM systems, we intro-
duce an abstract scenario called the exclusive call center problem. It
consists of a call center that has k operators capable of receiving
calls (i.e., the call center has communication capacity k). The call
center promises exclusivity to a single organization. This might be
desirable to ensure high quality of service, for legal reasons, or to
prevent the accidental leak of trade or business secrets to callers of
a different organization. When a caller issues a call, an automatic
answering machine M routes the call to an available operator who
then processes the call. IfM receives more calls than there are avail-
able operators, then M routes as many calls as it can, and notifies
the remaining callers that all operators are busy.
While the above seems reasonable, the call center in question
is greedy and wishes to oversubscribe its resources by contract-
ing with a second organization—thereby violating its exclusivity
agreement. This poses two problems for the call center. First, M
cannot determine to which organization a call belongs; only an op-
erator is in a position of making that distinction. Second, with the
current decision logic ofM (route to available operators, notify re-
maining callers that operators are busy), a group of callers from
the same organization can collectively determine that they are not
being given exclusive access to the call center (e.g., by placing k
calls and noticing that not all are picked up). Given these issues
and the limit of k operators (which is publicly known), can the call
center do anything to maintain the illusion of exclusivity?
The first observation that the call center’s CEO makes is that
while there are k operators, there is no guarantee that all of them
are available at any given point in time. After all, operators are
human and take breaks. This, the CEO believes, opens the door to
some level of plausible deniability. In particular, ifM gives a caller
from organization O1 a busy signal it could mean:
(1) All k operators are busy handling other callers from O1.
(2) Some operators are busy handling callers from O1 and the
remaining operators are on a break.
(3) Some operators are busy handling callers from O1, some are
busy handling callers from O2, and some are on a break.
Possibility 1 is the expected scenario of a high-efficiency trust-
worthy call center. Possibility 2 is an unwanted outcome since it is
inefficient, but it does not violate the contractual agreement. Pos-
sibility 3, however, violates the promise of exclusivity. The goal
of the call center is to design M such that it is hard for either of
the two organizations and their callers (assume no coordination
between organizations) to infer that possibility 3 is the one taking
place. As we alluded to earlier, the key challenge is that M cannot
distinguish between callers (and determine to which organization
they belong), and therefore cannot selectively lie to keep a consis-
tent set of responses. We thus ask whether there exists an M that
can leverage the proposed ambiguity to fool the organizations into
thinking they are exclusive.
We think of M as acting in rounds, where in each round, M
receives a set of calls C. We seek two informal properties fromM.
• Liveness: eventually a caller in C gets to talk to an operator.
• Privacy: it is computationally hard for any colluding subset of
callers S ⊆ C (some of whom may get to speak to operators)
to distinguish between a scenario where S = C and a scenario
where S ⊂ C (i.e., it is difficult for the colluding subset of callers
to determine whether they are the only callers or not).
The liveness guarantee is needed for M to be useful, but also
to rule out a trivial solution: if M never puts anyone through to
an operator, then the probability that any colluding set of callers S
can distinguish between S = C and S ⊂ C is 1/2.
Security game. To define privacy and liveness more formally, we
use a security game played between an adversary A and a chal-
lenger parameterized by a polynomial time answering machineM
and a security parameter λ. M takes as input a subset of callers
C from the set of all possible callers C, a communication capacity
k, and a random string r , where k = poly(λ), |C| = poly(λ), |r | =
poly(λ).M outputs a set of callers U ⊆ C, such that |U | ≤ k.
(1) A is given oracle access toM, and can issue a poly(λ) num-
ber of queries to M with arbitrary inputs C, k, r . For each
query,A can observe the corresponding resultU ← M(C, k, r).
(2) Challenger samples a random bit b uniformly in {0, 1}, and
a random string r uniformly in {0, 1}λ .
(3) A picks a set of callers S (where S ⊂ C) and positive integer
k, and sends them to the challenger.
(4) Challenger sets C = S if b = 0, and C = S ∪ {e} if b = 1
(where e is a uniform random element from the set C − S).
(5) Challenger callsM(C, k, r) to obtain U ⊆ C where |U | ≤ k.
(6) Finally, the challenger removes e fromU (if it is present) and
returns the result (U − {e}) toA.
(7) A outputs its guess b′, and wins the security game if b = b′.
In summary, the adversary’s goal in the game is to determine if
the challenger is communicating with the uncompromised caller e
after compromising all of the other callers (represented by S).
Definition 1 (Private answering machine). An answering machine
M guarantees privacy if in the above security game with parame-
ter λ, for all PPT algorithms A, there exists a negligible function1
negl such that: | Pr[b = b′] − 1/2| ≤ negl(λ), where the probability
is over the random coins ofM and the challenger.
Definition 2 (Live answering machine). An answering machine
M guarantees liveness if given security parameter λ, for any set of
callers C, positive communication capacity k, and random string
r , the probability that M(C, k, r) outputs a non-empty set is non-
negligible in λ. Here |C | = poly(λ),k = poly(λ), |r | = poly(λ), and
the probability is over the random coins ofM.
4 BUILDING ANSWERING MACHINES
We discuss two straw man proposals to highlight the challenge of
constructing an answering machine that meets Definitions 1 and 2.
Straw manM1:
• Input: C, k, r
• pi ← uniform pseudorandom permutation of C according to r
• Output: the first min(k, |C |) elements from pi
This is not secure. Let X be the random variable describing the
cardinality of the set returned to A, namely |U − {e}|. Assuming
that k ≤ |C |, Pr[X < k | b = 0] = 0 and Pr[X < k | b = 1] =
k/|C |. As a result, A can, by simply counting the elements in U −
{e}, distinguish between b = 0 and b = 1 with non-negligible
advantage.
Straw manM2:
• Input: C, k, r
• pi ← uniform pseudorandom permutation of C according to r
• Sample m ∈ [0,min(k, |C |)] uniformly at random
• Output: the first m elements from pi
1A function f : N → R is negligible if there exists an integer c such that for all
positive polynomials poly and all x greater than c, |f (x) | < 1/poly(x).
This is also not secure. Let k = 1 and |S | = 1. The probability that
the challenger returns toA an empty set is higher when b = 1 due
to Line 6 in the security game and the way we constructM2. Again,
let X be the random variable describing the cardinality of the set
returned to A. In particular, Pr[X < 1 | b = 0] = 1/2, whereas
Pr[X < 1 | b = 1] = 3/4. As a result, A can distinguish between
b = 0 and b = 1 with non-negligible advantage. More generally,
since X is drawn from a uniform distribution when b = 0, the
probability mass function (pmf) for X (assuming k ≤ |C |) is:
f (x) =
{
1
k+1
for 0 ≤ x ≤ k
0 otherwise
On the other hand, if b = 1, the pmf for X is:
f (x) =

1
k+1
+
1
2(k+1)
for x = 0
1
k+1
for 1 ≤ x ≤ k − 1
1
2(k+1)
for x = k
0 otherwise
An adversaryA can leverage the difference in these pmfs to dis-
tinguish between b = 0 and b = 1 with non-negligible advantage.
We could sample m and permute C non-uniformly, but the ef-
fect of Line 6 is large enough for A’s advantage to remain non-
negligible (M must output a non-empty set with non-negligible
probability to satisfy liveness). As a result, building anM that guar-
antees privacy and liveness without a bound on the cardinality ofC
seems hard. Below we give a construction under a relaxed setting.
4.1 Machine with a bound set of callers
We now discuss the construction of an answering machine that
provides privacy and liveness under the assumption that the there
is fixed upper bound on the number of possible callers (|C|) and
this bound is known in advance to M (the machine still does not
knowwhich callers belong to a particular organization). As a result,
we assume that each element e in C can be uniquely mapped to
an integer in the range [1, |C|] with the map id(e), and that this
mapping is known to M. The id map can be set arbitrarily if the
identity of all potential callers is known ahead of time, or populated
dynamically as calls are processed (a new caller e is assigned a
randomly unused integer in [1, |C|] and this value is returned every
time that e calls).
Private and live answering machine M3:
• Input: C, k, r
• U ← ∅
• ∀e∈C ,∀0≤i<k , if id(e) ≡ (r + i) mod |C|, add e to U
• Output: U
In other words, M3 precomputes a schedule mapping callers to
rounds: in each round a set of k callers will be serviced (the input
r is the current round). If a caller happens to call during a round
that has been allocated for it, it will be added to the set U (i.e., its
call will be handled). Otherwise, the call will not be answered.
Machine M3 guarantees liveness because for every caller e, ev-
ery k out of |C| rounds are assigned to e; since |C| = poly(λ),
this occurs with non-negligible probability. Machine M3 guaran-
tees privacy because the response given to A at the end of the
game (Step 6 in the security game) depends only on r and not on b.
As a result this response is exactly the same when b = 0 and b = 1;
observing this response gives no advantage toA.
5 COMPROMISED FRIEND ATTACK
The exclusive call center problem is the scenario encountered by
users inMPMsystemswho communicatewith compromised friends.
Clients in these systems can only handle a fixed number of concur-
rent conversations in one round (this maps to the k operators in
the call center problem), which opens the door to an attack that we
call the compromised friend (CF) attack. An adversary—via com-
promised friends—can dial (or start a conversation through any
other means supported by the MPM system) a client and observe
whether the client responds or not. If the client does not have a pri-
vate answering machine, the adversary can distinguish between a
scenario where the client is talking to some honest client (i.e., the
adversary’s subset of callers is not the full set, S ⊂ C), and a sce-
nario where the client is not (S = C). This can leak one bit of
information that opens the door to existing attacks.
Intersection, disclosure, and hitting set attacks. There is a
large literature of traffic analysis attacks that uncover patterns of
communication by observing when users send and receive mes-
sages. For example, intersection attacks [24] can be used to narrow
down the possible recipients of a message when users communi-
cate with a single friend, while disclosure [1] and hitting set [16]
attacks can handle the case where users communicate with multi-
ple friends. There are also statistical variants of these attacks [8].
MPM systems purportedlyavoid these attacks by requiring clients
to always be online, continuously sending and retrieving messages;
the client sends dummy requests if the user is idle. Unfortunately,
the CF attack allows an adversary to guess whether a client is send-
ing dummy messages or not with non-negligible advantage. An
adversary can therefore target a set of potential senders and recip-
ients with a CF attack, making these systems vulnerable to traffic
analysis. Note that the CF attack can be achieved in another way: If
a pair of friends is currently communicating at a rate of r messages
per round (r < k), and they wish to increase this rate to improve
their throughput, this is the moral equivalent of dialing (since it
consumes a client’s limited communication capacity).
Difficulty of conducting a CF attack in practice. There are
some challenges in composing a CF attack with existing attacks.
First, depending on the answering mechanism of the MPM system,
an adversary might need to conduct a CF attackmany times before
learning anything useful (recall from Section 3 that while the ad-
versary has non-negligible advantage, it might still be small). How-
ever, existing MPM systems (e.g., [3, 18, 27]) currently implement
an answering mechanism that leaks information with a single CF
attack. Second, the CF attack requires actively targeting users on a
given round, which may limit the number of observations that are
available to an adversary. Last, this attack requires compromising
users’ actual friends or it requires the use of phishing attacks to
fool users into befriending malicious users.
6 MITIGATION STRATEGIES
We now discuss ways in which MPM systems could prevent a CF
attack. One option is for clients to use a private answering ma-
chine such as M3 (§4.1) to determine which of the new (or exist-
ing) conversations to accept (or continue) without leaking infor-
mation. Clients would continue to exchange kmessages per round,
but only a subset of these messages (based on the output of M3)
would correspond to actual conversations; the rest would act as
cover traffic. Note that with M3, a compromised friend can learn
how many other friends a user has, or at least an upper bound
on it (i.e., |C|). Furthermore, M3 accepts messages from a partic-
ular friend for a sliding window of k rounds, so it is possible for
two users’ sliding windows to never intercept. As a result, if the
MPM system does not allow the retrieval of messages from pre-
vious rounds, clients would be unable to communication without
additional mechanisms.
In principle, when usingM3, we could set C to be all users in the
system rather than just a client’s friends (so the adversary learns no
information);M3’s function id could be computed with a collision-
resistant hash function. Provided that the number of total users (n)
is poly(λ), this would technically meet our liveness requirement
(Definition 2). In practice, however, this would result in a client
accepting a call from a given friend every k out of n rounds, which
is a prohibitive delay when n is large.
The alternative to using a private answering machine is for clients
to set their communication capacity (k) to a value larger than their
maximum number of friends (under the assumption that each pair
of friends exchanges at most one message per round). This too
would leak the bound on the number of friends of a given client. If
a client wishes to keep this information private, a client could set
k to be the total number of users in the system. While this would
leak no information, the communication and computational costs
of existing MPM systems increase linearly with k (though some
systems have sublinear computational costs [3]), making it prohib-
itive for systems with many users. More worryingly, several MPM
systems [26, 27] provide guarantees that are based on differential
privacy, and increasing the number of concurrent conversations
(k) accelerates the consumption of users’ privacy budgets.
7 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In this workwe introduced an attack that allows an adversary to vi-
olate the guarantees of MPM systems by leveraging users’ friends.
We also proposed several mitigations, but our proposals satisfy
only two out of three desirable properties: privacy (leak no infor-
mation), low communication overhead (i.e., clients need not send
many messages per round), and low latency (friends get to talk to
each other often). The most pragmatic of our solutions requires
bounding the maximum number of friends that a client can have.
Even with our mitigations, compromised friends are a liabil-
ity and can be used to learn sensitive information through other
means. For example, if a user is uncharacteristically slow to re-
spond to a compromised friend’s message (a user’s response pat-
tern could be constructed over many prior interactions), this anom-
aly in itself leaks information. We believe that understanding the
impact of this type of attack in practice is a promising avenue for
future work.
UPDATE (10/23/2018)
Zachary Ratliff pointed out an ambiguity in the requirement of ma-
chine M3 and the construction of the id map in the version of this
paper that appeared at WPES. We have clarified the requirement
in this draft.
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